The paper shows how entrepreneurial taxes interact with the career choice of individuals, the quality of entrepreneurs, and their investment behavior. It is particularly relevant to differentiate the early effects on start-up enterprises with substantial uncertainty from the tax effects on mature firms where the uncertainty is resolved. Conditions are derived for the Nordic dual income tax to be neutral and they are found to be stringent. Profit expectations matter. The Nordic dual encourages (discourages) the establishment of new enterprises by entrepreneurs who anticipate high (low) profitability.
Introduction
The idea of taxing capital and labor income di¤erently has received substantially attention over several years (Sødersen 2005a (Sødersen , 2005b Lindhe-Södersten-Öberg, 2002 . The theoretical foundations for such a proposition from the point of view of optimal tax theory have been explored by Sødersen (2005b) in particular. One of them is the change of the world economy towards internationally more mobile capital. The income of entrepreneurs represents partly return on capital invested and partly compensation for their entrepreneurial e¤ort and ability. Hence, entrepreneurial income is the natural subject of a mixed tax treatment. In the development of such an approach, the Nordic countries were pioneers. In the early 1990s Finland, Sweden and Norway replaced their global income taxation, where all economic income is subject to a single progressive tax schedule, by a version of dual income taxation. The personal income of an entrepreneur was divided into capital income and earned income. Only the latter is taxed at a progressive schedule while the former is taxed at a ‡at rate. Hence, it was necessary to solve di¢cult problems of …nding an appropriate splitting procedure. The solutions for this problem were not coordinated.
Instead, somewhat di¤erent experiments were undertaken. 1 The Nordic reforms were designed to produce e¢ciency gains by reducing the distortion caused by the non-uniform treatment of di¤erent kinds of income from capital in the old system and to adopt, instead, a clear-cut dual income tax Sørensen 1997 and Sørensen 2005b) . Also Tikka (1993) saw the Nordic dual as a small country response to increasing international capital mobility. Subsequently, Sørensen (1994) suggested that dual income tax may 1 The Nordic dual with its split rules has attracted wide interest, re ‡ected also in the recent DICE Report of CESifo (DICE 2004 ). In the German popular debate, the dual tax has been seen as a practical solution to tax competion from economies in transition. Indeed, the most recent contribution appears to be the detailed proposal for a comprehensive tax reform by the German Council of Economic Experts (2006) . A proposal for a Swiss reform has been worked by Keuschnigg and Dietz (2005) . 1 cause fewer distortions than the conventional income tax. Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) argued that the latter has a distortionary bias against investment in non-human capital, which can be o¤set in the dual taxation. Sørensen (2005a Sørensen ( , 2005b ) elaborates a new split rule that delivers neutrality of investment and …nancing decisions of entrepreneurs.
The major novelty of the Nordic dual appears in its acknowledgement that the taxation of the entrepreneurial income should di¤erentiate the income from capital and labor e¤ort. Split rules were introduced, de…ning the maximum that is viewed as capital income for tax purposes. The practical solution revolved around …nding a measure of assets invested (capital base) and an appropriate rate of return on those assets (to be called a presumptive rate of return) . 2 The approach has been found appropriate whether the unincorporated entrepreneur operates as self-employed or an employer as a sole proprietor, is part of a partnership or runs a closely-held corporation (CHC). The income of those entrepreneurs is viewed as personal income and it is not subject to a separate pro…ts tax. 3 The splitting approach thus applies to the income (pro…t) of the unincorporated entrepreneurs. It also applies to the dividends from incorporated closely-held companies 4 . Otherwise, the taxation principles of widely-held (e.g. listed) companies apply to the CHS's. The dividends and realized capital gains from them are always treated as income from capital. Prior to the personal tax, pro…ts from incorporated businesses are taxed at the corporation tax rate.
The idea of a dual income tax can be built into the tax system in various 2 A separate proportional tax on all types of capital income has been another feature of the solution. The bene…ts of the latter choice have been recognized in the Johansson-Samuelson theorem, explicated by Sinn (1987) , saying that a uniform tax on all capital income, net of true economic depreciation, is neutral in respect of the choice of investment projects. 3 Note that also the workers' return on saving is taxed as capital income, not as earned income. Uniformity requires the the same principle applies to enterpreneurs. 4 The motive for the dividend split in the case of CHSs is di¤erent from that on unincorporated entrepreneurs, i.e. to prevent tax arbitrage. This is the Swedish and Finnish approach. Up to 2005, Norway split the income of a CHC at the …rm level. In the most recent reform, also Norway has moved to split the dividends.
ways. In the recent Keuschnigg and Dietz (2005) tax proposal, the income tax is dual in the sense that the taxation of capital income is based on a relatively low tax rate while the taxation of earned income is progressive with the highest marginal tax rates exceeding the proportional tax rate on capital income. This is in line with the Nordic dual income tax. The entrepreneurs' income, however, is not split. The double tax on equity returns is mitigated by the introduction of the ACE allowance. When it comes to tax the rent, the top marginal tax rate on equity returns is aligned to the top marginal tax rate on earned income.
The purpose of the latter feature is to alleviate the income shifting incentive.
There are a few earlier studies on the behavior of enterprises under the dual income tax. Hagen and Sørensen (1998) discussed at length the division of income from small businesses. Kari (1999) argued that, depending on how the ceiling of imputed capital income is determined, the Finnish dual income tax may lead to a strong investment incentive for closely-held companies. Lindhe et al. (2002 Lindhe et al. ( , 2004 showed that the Swedish splitting scheme, based on the acquisition value of company shares, is neutral in its treatment of investments by a closely-held company (CHC) …nanced by retained earnings in respect of those by a widely-held one. The Norwegian scheme was found to be distortive. Alstadsaeter (2003) considered the Norwegian case, suggesting that it provides entrepreneurs with great incentives to participate in tax-minimizing income shifting. She also concluded that the Norwegian dual income tax leads to overinvestment and that the corporate organizational form serves as a tax shelter for high-income entrepreneurs. Hagen and Sørensen (1998) Though several papers have discussed enterprise taxation, we undertake our tax analysis in a di¤erent model. We develop a model of an entrepreneur whose decisions include the entry at the start-up stage enterprise subject to an entry cost (initial e¤ort needed), the failure risk, the expansion investment of the surviving enterprises and the withdrawal of the founding entrepreneur at the mature state, when he can give up his "baby". Most important, our framework for an owner-managed enterprise is able to adopt the role of risk-taking of an entrepreneur. 5 We ask under what conditions the Nordic approach satis…es the neutrality criterion in respect of the entrepreneurial choices. Is the Nordic approach a reasonable strategy to tax entrepreneurs? This is our research question. Moreover, we ask what e¤ects it exerts on the start-up stage and expansion stage cost of capital and whether it interferes the occupational choice of potential entrepreneurs.
In our analysis, the wage rate and market interest rate are given. These assumptions are consistent with the idea of enterprises being hosted by a small open economy with the wage rate being determined by productivity in the tradeables sector and with the residence principle applied for the taxation of worldwide interest income. The start-up is assumed to be domestically owned and we focus on start-ups …nanced by the entrepreneur's own funds. Therefore the domestic taxes on dividends and capital gains remain relevant.
Our …ndings include some general results and some related to the Nordic dual in particular. The neutrality results of dividend taxation from the tax theory of mature companies do not carry over to start-ups. Theory of the cost of capital for investments has centered on the issue of whether double taxation of dividends matters for marginal investments or whether it is that of retained earnings, the dividend tax falling upon inframarginal investments. 6 We show that it is indispensable to di¤erentiate the early tax e¤ects on start-up enterprises from the tax e¤ects on mature …rms. One lesson from our research is that double taxation of dividends can raise the total tax rate on entrepreneurial income above that on earned income, making dividend tax to act as an entry barrier. I n v e s t m e n ti na… rst-stage project thus provides a risky return
Our notation here is non-standard but useful in showing that a successful entrepreneur gets back his initial investment and an incremental return ( ; )
The signal can take three values, . With the probabilities the project will be a success, the initial investment being recovered and an op-6 erating pro…t made with ( ; ) ( ; ) 0. We assume to be jointly concave in and . Success occurs with the probability + 1.
Failure occurs with the probability 1 ¡ § when the project is of the type = and returns nil. Enterprises with a bad signal leave the market.
Those with a good signal have the option to allocate the …rst-stage cash ‡ow to an immediate dividend, or to expansion investment 0at time =1 . If only to clarify, the decisions on career choice, e¤ort ( ), initial investment ( ) and …rst production are undertaken in period 0 After the signal has arrived, the expansion investment and dividend ( ) are decided in period 1
To highlight the idea that risks are greatest at the early stage of a project,
we assume that the second-stage return is not subject to uncertainty. The enterprise or its capital is assumed to be sold at its net asset value at time
=2
To emphasize the fundamental di¤erences between start-up enterprises and mature companies, we introduce di¤erent technologies in the two stages, ( ; ) ( ; ). The second-stage technology can be viewed as an advanced version of the …rst-stage technology, formally expressed as ( ; )= (0 ; ) It does not require specialized inputs. Hence, no e¤ort is needed and the return is given by ( ; ) which, given , is increasing and strictly concave in and If only to economize, we suppress and work with ( ; ). 7 The second-stage return is greater for an -…rm than for an -…rm, i.e. ( ; ) ( ; ).
We assume that the …rst-stage capital depreciates fully while the secondstage capital does not. This distinction also highlights the heterogeneity of capital over the life-cycle of the enterprise. In the second production stage the 7 Note, however, that represents a unique ability, imbedded in the personality of the entrepreneur, to create cash ‡ows. Intuitively, as the start-up technology is a prototype of the mature company, the di¤erence arises from learning and business experience. To survive successfully into an expansion stage, it is also necessary for the entrepreneur to develop a proper organizational set-up for his business, a well functioning entrepreneurial or corporate culture. In a merger, the acquiring …rm loses the unique ability of the entrepreneur unless his ability is imbedded in the corporate culture. In terms of backward induction, the project value at the beginning of the second stage is
Then, the optimal risky career satis…es
where ¤ 1 ( ) = max 1 ( ; ) provided that the participation constraint (7) below is satis…ed. The …rst-order conditions for the maximization of (3) are
The cost of capital for expansion investment of surviving enterprises is given by (4), the rate of interest. The enterprise of the more pro…table entrepreneur has a greater growth, . The …rst-stage cost of capital is (5) and 8 accommodates the risk e¤ect. The probability of success § raises the expected return (left-hand side) and the probability of failure 1¡ § increases the cost of capital (right-hand side). The latter is the skill-scaled asset cost, 1 multiplied by the full opportunity cost of funds employed. High failure risk (1 ¡ § )
thus raises the initial cost of capital, discouraging early investment. More able entrepreneurs invest more initially. Note that when the two conditions (4) and (5) hold with equality, they describe an interior solution for optimal dividend along the growth path. 8 Condition (6), with ( )= The concept of the entry threshold in terms of the marginal entrepreneurial ability completes our basic framework. At the outset, entrepreneurs do not know the true type of their project, only its distribution. They compare various candidate projects using the discount rate, to provide a ranking.
Those who enter as entrepreneurs evaluate the expected value of their career,
, and compare it to the life-time value of an outside option, labor income, insured by social insurance. Then, the entry threshold is given by
Evaluating,
holds because by the envelope theorem we need to consider only the direct e¤ect of a parameter change on the optimized function (3). The project value is proportionately increasing in entrepreneurial ability. The most able agents become entrepreneurs, given that the outside option is unrelated to the entrepreneurial skill. For the marginal 8 We can also have a corner solution with all cash ‡ow invested and no dividends paid out if the second-stage investment is expected to be highly pro…table with ( b ) . Excluding the possibility of a negative dividend (share issue), the cost of capital does not determine the amount invested. In this paper, we do not analyze corner solutions in depth.
entrepreneur with ability , ¤ 0 ( )= holds.
Tax E¤ects on Sole Proprietors and Partnerships
In the case of a sole proprietor or a partnership member, there is no dividend income for tax purposes. Without a split approach, the business income of a sole proprietor or a partnership member is taxed at the rate on earned income, This is the tax rate determined by the realized total business income in the respective income band on the progressive rate schedule, but we assume it to take only two values where is the tax rate on interest income.
For pro…table enterprises, it holds . However, we do not want to exclude the possibility that for low-income entrepreneurs it may be that 9 In the Nordic dual, the entrepreneur's business income is split in order to tax part of it as capital income. The basic principles of unincorporated enterprises are the same in all Nordic countries. Our question is when a split approach is neutral with respect to the early-stage and later-stage cost of capital. Then, we ask whether the Nordic system deviates from the neutrality benchmark. In the case of a sole proprietor or a partnership, retained pro…t once taxed is not subject of another tax at exit when the business is sold out at its net asset value in the …nal stage.
Consider …rst taxation without the split. Denoting the tax rate on interest income by the net rate of interest is given by = (1 ¡ )e with e denoting the gross interest rate. Under success, the tax liability is thus
9 Actually, this holds in the Finnish case.
10
The sole proprietor maximizes
where (¢) is given by (3). The …rst-order conditions of this optimization problem are
We notice that these conditions are also the benchmark values of a Johansson- The after-tax value of the entrepreneurial career in the second stage is then
Solving for the optimal expansion investment
Require now in the tax system with di¤erent from that the pre-tax cost of capital equals that in the tax-free economy, the gross interest rate = e
13
we obtain for the neutrality condition,
We thus have proved Proposition 1 For tax neutrality in respect to growth of the enterprises of selfemployed and partnerships enterprises, the marginal tax shield produced by the split system should satisfy
The legislator has therefore alternatives. It can introduce either a high presumptive rate and low marginal base . 12 Some authors prefer the terms normal dividend and excess dividends. . . . " Jouko kirjoittaa lyhyen alaviitan. 13 Note that the gross interest rate e is the same in the tax-free and in the taxed economy as we have assumed the case of a small open economy.
Nordic dual can be interpreted to be based on the idea that 2 = Hence 0 2 ( )=1 Neutrality of the Nordic dual thus requires that = e i.e. that the presumptive rate equals the gross interest rate.
Investment Incentive in the Growth
Stage If the legislator has ended up in a non-neutral taxation of entrepreneurs, we report a powerful result.
Proposition 2 For those entrepreneurs whose realized pro…t was low with , the split system represents a penalty on expansion investment.
For those enterprises which turned out to be highly pro…table, the split system provides a strong investment incentive in the expansion stage.
Proof. The conclusion can be obtained from the sign of the latter term including
n the above …rst-order condition (14) .
Uncertainty about is revealed before the expansion investment so that the tax relief is available for those entrepreneurs who expect their total business income to settle in the income band where they face a tax rate . But, if the business generates relatively little total income so that holds in that income band, the Nordic split rule alters into an additional tax on the entrepreneur's expansion-stage capital, leading to a higher cost of capital than without the dual.
14 In deriving the above result, we have considered the tax rate structure as given. When a split system is introduced in an equilibrium where investment behavior is distorted by the existing tax system, the Nordic dual appears to provide a second-best improvement. Entrepreneurs with pro…table ideas …nd that the tax on retained pro…t is reduced, making an expansion investment worthwhile at the margin.
Initial Investment
The expected …rst-stage tax liability is
Inserting this into the value function, the …rst-order condition in respect of the
We contrast this to the comparable condition in a tax-free economy § 0 ( ; )=e +1¡ § Solving for 0 1 ( ) which maintains the investment equal to that in a tax-free economy,
To satisfy neutrality in the case of uncertainty about the success and the industry prospects, the marginal capital base 0 1 ( ) ought to be industry-or even enterprise speci…c as it depends on pro…t expectations and their probabilities.
Moreover, it depends on the existing tax rates, Such a challenging outcome may be a relevant requirement in the real world but it is an unrealistic one. However, it is useful to consider the neutrality when only the risk of failure is involved.
Failure Risk and the Neutrality Condition Let us thus give up for a moment the distinction between high-pro…table and low-pro…table enterprises.
Assume that all entrepreneurs face the risk of failure (1 ¡ ) but in case of success (with probability ) have the same pro…tability. The above condition 14 simpli…es to
In a tax-free economy, 0 ( ; )=e +1¡ Inserting, we obtain the neutrality condition
Proposition 3
In the presence of a failure risk, the neutrality condition for the Nordic dual with respect to the early investment is
This gives the split rule which yields the same …rst-period investment. We can interpret the Nordic approach such that the early stage capital base equals the capital invested, 1 ( )= Then, the presumptive rate should not only be related to the risk-adjusted interest rate e but also to the tax structure. This creates some tedious practical problems. In practice, the Nordic countries have chosen to adjust the presumptive rate for, say an average (economy-wide) risk premium. This is "on average" a good way to go though inter-…rm di¤erences in risks somewhat distort the outcome.
Considering our Propositions 1 and 3 together, the government faces a tradeo¤. If the presumptive tax rate is chosen to satisfy the neutrality of investment in the expansion stage, = e this may clearly discourage the early (riskier) investment. On the other, if the risk adjustment is carried out to achieve neutrality in the early investment, mature …rms may overinvest. 15 Actual Investment Incentives How does the actual non-neutral split rule a¤ect the behavioral incentives? We obtain Proposition 4 For those entrepreneurs who expect to face a tax rate , the split system represents a penalty on start-up investment and e¤ort, magnifying the risk of failure e¤ect. However, for those enterprises which expect to face a tax rate , the split system provides a strong investment incentive in the early stage.
Proof. The result derived from the …rst-order condition (16) 
Dual Taxation of Closely-Held Incorporated Enterprises
In the case of sole proprietors and partnerships, the Nordic countries have adopted an approach where it is the business income which is subject to the split while in the case of closely held corporation, it is the dividend. This holds also for Norway after the most recent tax reform.
Our modelling can be interpreted to capture both the classical and the imputations systems, regarding an incorporated company and its owners as separate tax entities. One can think that the imputation systems are re ‡ected in the magnitude of our tax rates and . Such an interpretation simpli…es the notation.
Let denote the tax rates on pro…ts, dividends and earned income.
Write …rst the expression for the present value of the integrated tax liability of a successful CHC without the split rule
The operating pro…ts ( ) and ( ) form the corporation tax base.
The entrepreneur's dividend tax base is = (1 ¡ ) ( )+ ¡ at time =1. The assets of an enterprise are sold at their net asset value at time =2 and the returns are paid out as dividends.
Growth Stage: Tax Neutrality Consider then the split rule applied to dividends. The taxman imputes the income from capital at a presumptive rate of return, , taxes 1 , at the rate on dividends while the remaining distributed pro…t, ¡ 1 is taxed at the rate on earned income, Then the personal dividend taxes paid by the entrepreneur at time =1and =2are
making the present value of the integrated tax liability
It is assumed that the taxman allows to be deductible in the second period. 16 Inserting the tax liability in the valuation expression, we can analyze the issue of tax neutrality.
Using the value function in the second stage is, the …rst-order condition in respect of is
It appears that for investment neutrality in the expansion stage, the Nordic dual should make 2 unrelated to the capital making This follows from two e¤ects, the Johansson-Samuelson tax ( = ) and the capitalization of the dividend tax. 17 We notice that Lindhe, Södersten and Öberg (2004) were able to obtain organizational neutrality between the behavior of a CHC and a WHC, but the investment neutrality was not possible to obtain.
In the case of the Finnish capital base with = enterprise taxation appears to have clear-cut e¤ects on the expansion stage, discriminating between high-and low-pro…table companies due to their the tax rate di¤erential ¡ :
Proposition 5 The Nordic dual, encourages the enterprise growth for those enterprises which turned out to pass the initial stage with a high pro…tability.
The Nordic dual punishes the expansion of those enterprises which turned out to be less pro…table.
CHC: Initial Investment
We focus on the case where the entrepreneur knows that the tax authority allows him to deduct the …rst-stage investment cost from the tax base in the second period, as it cannot represent income.
has bearing on the …rst-stage results.
Solving again for the …rst-order condition § (1¡ )
Again in a tax-free economy, § 0 ( ; )=e +1¡ § Solving, for the neutrality condition
Our earlier impression repeats itself here: it is hard to obtain neutrality within the Nordic dual taxation in the initial stage. We notice that in the case of closely-held companies, it is not possible to have a simple neutrality condition because the tax rates vary across individuals. Though this conclusion is somewhat pessimistic for those aiming at tax neutrality, we can see from the …rst-order condition that the actual Nordic dual has predictable implications for the investment behavior of the CHC's.
Proposition 6
The Nordic split rule encourages the start-up investment of entrepreneurs expecting to be pro…table facing a tax rate and discourages the investment of entrepreneurs expecting to run less pro…table enterprises, facing the tax rate
E¤ects of Uncertainty We are, however, able to qualify the neutrality result when working with the success/failure but abstracting from the di¤erences in the expected pro…tability. In the presence of the failure risk, the neutrality condition for the Nordic dual with respect to the early investment k in CHC's simpli…es to
Regardless of the complications, the risk of failure has a predictable e¤ect:
for neutrality, the failure risk enhances the required marginal capital base. One can somewhat simplify this result in the case where the elimination of the double taxation is feasible. Then, (1 ¡ )=0and the conditions reads
It is a property of the Johansson-Samuelson tax with full loss o¤sets that the tax structure is neutral in respect of the career choice between the outside option and operating as a sole proprietor (i.e. an unincorporated enterprise).
There is no tax issue involved. Yet most of the small enterprises operate in an incorporated form. We show that the reasons must be other than taxation, like access to limited liability and other net bene…ts. We argue that taxation need not be neutral in respect of the formation of incorporated companies, as CHC's.
We examine the entry threshold for the CHC's in general and, thereafter, within the Nordic dual.
When incorporated, the entrepreneur maximizes
where the notation with the super index denotes the variables under taxation.
Consider …rst the entrepreneurial choices under a uniform structure of tax rates, 
where 1 is a strictly positive constant and greater than one.
Proof. Available in the Technical Appendix.
The proposition suggests that even a uniform tax structure = = = is distortive in respect of enterprise formation. With identical cash ‡ows, the after-tax enterprise value would be lower in the classical tax system than the present value of the after-tax outside option. The dividend tax, unless an imputation is introduced, is distortionary and a¤ects the career choice of 18 The proof is available in the Technical Appendix. Proof. Plug (17) into (16) and that into (9) to obtain ( ) the tax- To clarify the mechanism, we notice that with given tax rates, an increase in the presumptive rate reduces both the marginal and the average tax rate of high-pro…tability enterprises, creating the incentive suggested by our proposition.
Concluding Discussion
In dual income taxation a split rule is needed for closely-held companies and sole proprietors to divide business income into income from capital and labor income.
Its purpose is twofold i.e. avoiding overtaxing the return on capital in unincorporated enterprises and to prevent the entrepreneurs organized as CHS's from shifting their labor income to the sphere of income from capital. This paper has studied the incentives created by such a split. We have emphasized the need to incorporate the neglected observation, the di¤erential treatment of low and high pro…tability enterprises into the theory of enterprise taxation. The rules may in fact raise the tax burden of low-pro…tability small enterprises. These entrepreneurs face a higher cost of capital for start-up and expansion investments and 23 a higher tax cost on e¤ort provision than without the dual rules. The opposite incentives are o¤ered to high-pro…tability enterprises. Their distributed pro…ts would be taxed residually as earned income at a higher rate than the tax rate on capital income. By refraining from distributing such residual dividends and instead by investing and expanding their asset base, the basis of imputed future capital income, the entrepreneurs can smooth their tax payments. 19 In our paper, we abstract from the outside …nancing for several reasons. Introducing outside …nance would raise pertinent issue arising from informational asymmetries between the entrepreneurs and the …nanciers. We point to Fuest, Huber and Nielssen (2002) paper for discussion of those issues in the case of debt …nance and to Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002) in the case of venture capital …nance. The earlier results by Kari (1999) and Lindhe, Södersten and Öberg (2004) point to the view that the introduction of debt …nancing does not raise behavioral incentives which would be particularly relevant for the dual tax.
As regards a comprehensive income tax with full o¤setting of losses, which is neutral in respect of the career choice between an entrepreneur or a laborer, we show that a tax rate increase in a system with a uniform rate structure over all kinds of income can increase the ability threshold of individuals who choose entrepreneurship. With such a rate structure, the e¤ects of the dual rules themselves vanish by de…nition. A general tax rate cut within uniform tax rates thus induces a larger proportion of individuals to choose entrepreneurship. But, with non-uniform personal tax rates, the Nordic dual, with its embedded split rule, tends to lower (raise) the ability threshold of entrepreneurs who expect high (low) pro…tability from their enterprises. Therefore, we conclude that the Nordic dual enhances entrepreneurship where high pro…tability is expected. 19 The dual rules prevent the entrepreneur from avoiding the high marginal tax rate on earned income at exit by either double-taxing undistributed pro…ts (Finland), taxing only windfall capital gains (Norway) or by applying the split rule to realized capital gains (Sweden). 
or
Derive then the impact of an increase in the tax rate on the ability of the marginal entrepreneur. There will be three mechanisms to be considered. First, a marginal increase in tax rates reduces the after-tax cash ‡ows to the enterprise in both production periods. This tends to raise the entrepreneurial threshold.
However, there is an o¤setting e¤ect to the extent that the discount rate decreases. This e¤ect will tend to push up the discounted value of the after-tax cash ‡ows, though they are reduced in size. Third, an increased tax on interest income raises the present value of wage income in labor contracts. This is also bad news for entrepreneurship because it tends to push up the entrepreneurial threshold as labor market prospects are more attractive than they used to be.
The present value of labor income, written explicitly, is
and we recall, 
The entrepreneurial threshold is distorted by taxation even at uniform rates, basically because entrepreneurial income is subject to double taxation in an incorporated enterprise. This is the e¤ect hinted at by King (1989) . The ability threshold of the marginal entrepreneur is increased if 0 The expression for can be grouped into two positive terms and one negative term. Recall that the opportunity cost can be thought of as a compound return over a number of years and the operating cash ‡ows are similarly accumulated returns over each stage. Therefore, the positive terms outweigh the negative term.
Proof of Proposition 7.
In the absence of taxation, the marginal entrepreneur is identi…ed from the condition ¡ ( ( )+ )+ 
We know that under distortive taxes, and that Thus,
